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That free trade requires the harmonisation of the domestic
institutions (e.g. the retail distribution system), policies (e.g.
environmental and labour standards) and practices (e.g. corporate
relationships as in Japanese keiretsus) across trading nations is an
idea that has now assumed center stage. The resulting demands to
reduce, even eliminate, such domestic diversity among nations that
seek freer trade among themselves, raise three central questions:
*What has led to these demands to reduce diversity?
*What, in economic logic, are the virtues and vices of
diversity?
*Where diversity is beneficial, how can it be sustained despite
the demands for harmonisation that threaten it?
In this paper, I address the first of these questions. The
factors that produce harmonisation and demands for it can be
divided, for analytical convenience, into philosophical (Section 1),
economic and political. The economic arguments, in turn, divide into
those resulting from changes in the world economy and hence may be
called structural (Section II) and those that derive from the notion
that without harmonisation the conventional case for mutuality of
the gains from free trade is invalid and hence may be called
welfare-theoretic (Section III). The political (Section IV)
arguments relate primarily to the use of "fair trade" arguments to
extract protection as also to the fear that, in the absence of
harmonisation, the higher-standard countries will face political
pressures, under free trade with lower-standard countries, to lower
their own standards.
I. PHILOSOPHICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY
The philosophical arguments for harmonisation arise in regard
to environmental and labour standards in particular, and can be
traced to three sorts of reasoning:
*A sense of transborder obligation owed to others leads those
interested in environmental and labour rights (and human rights in
general) to demand that the nation states where these others are
citizens should sustain those rights, and to use the threat of denial
of existing and prospective trading opportunities to prod or coerce
these nations into the scaling-up of their environmental and labour
standards.
*Questions of distributive justice also arise when it is feared
that freer trade with poor, unskilled-labour-abundant countries that
have lower environmental and labour standards will result in the
immiseration of one's proletariat (with the gains from trade, and
more, accruing to other factors of production), and that even the
welfare of the workers in these countries may be further worsened
paradoxically.
Then, there is simply the fact that firms in higher-standard
countries feel that fairness in competition requires that the burdens
put on costs by environmental and labour standards ought not to
differ across countries in free trade. Fairness, like beauty, is in the
eye of the beholder and the fact that this view is now increasingly
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held among business groups makes it a potent force, in addition to
all others, driving the demands for harmonisation of such standards.
1. The Question of Obligation Bevond Borders
In matters of social policy, relating to environment and labour
standards, there is at work a sense of the obligation that we as
human beings owe one another. This sense of obligation prompts and
legitimates the use of the power and instrumentalities of the
politically stronger nations to cajole and, if necessary, coerce the
weaker nations into implementing policies that conform to the
moral behavior that the obligation defines and requires of all
nations in the discharge of their authority over their subjects, thus
producing upward harmonisation of their environmental and labour
standards with one's own.
The sense of transborder moral obligation is of course ancient,
long predating the modern nation state. As John Dunn, the Cambridge
political theorist, has reminded us eloquently in tracing the origins
of the notion of a "human community,11 and the consequent answer to
the question of what human beings owe one another:
...an old answer [to the question of what we owe to others] with deep Greek and
Christian roots, is that there is just one human community, "that great and
natural community" (Locke 1988, Second Treatise, para 128), as John Locke
called it, of all human beings as natural creatures, whose habitat is the whole
globe and whose obligations to one another do not stop at any humanly created -
any artificial -- boundary. Locke had a very powerful explanation of why this
was so, an explanation which tied human obligations immediately to the purposes
of God himself (Dunn 1984). A pale shadow of Locke's conception, with God
tactfully edited out, still lives on in modern secular understandings of human
rights...and, even more diffusely, in anthropocentric interpretations of the
collective ecological imperative to save a habitat for the human species as a
whole.1
The weakness of this obligation in reality, and the strength of
it in moral philosophy, have preoccupied many over the years. Thus,
David Hume, who attributed such obligation to sentiment rather than
reason, argued that "it is not contrary to reason to prefer the
destruction of the whole world to the scratching of my finger".2 In a
similar vein, Adam Smith argued:3
Let us suppose that the great empire of China, with all its myriads of
inhabitants, was suddenly swallowed up by an earthquake and let us consider how
a man of humanity in Europe, who had no sort of connexion with that part of the
world, would be affected upon receiving intelligence of this dreadful calamity. He
would, I imagine, first of all express very strongly his sorrow for the
misfortune of that unhappy people, he would make many melancholy reflections
upon the precariousness of human life and the vanity of all the labours of man
which could thus be annihilated in a moment. He would too, perhaps, if he was a
man of speculation, enter into many reasonings concerning the effects which this
disaster might produce upon the commerce of Europe and the trade and business
of the world in general. And when all this fine philosophy was over, when all
these humane sentiments had been once fairly expressed, he would pursue his
business or pleasure, take his repose or his diversion, with the same ease and
tranquility as if no such accident had happened.
The most frivolous disaster which could befall himself would occasion a
more real disturbance. If he was to lose his little finger to-morrow, he would
not sleep to-night; but, provided he never saw them, he would snore with the
most profound security over the ruin of a hundred millions of his brethren. The
destruction of that immense multitude seems plainly an object less interesting to
him than this paltry misfortune of his own. To prevent, therefore, this paltry
misfortune to himself would a man of humanity be willing to sacrifice the lives of
a hundred millions of his brethen, provided he had never seen them?
While moral philosophers have considered how to deduce such
obligation, and political theorists have speculated why the sense of
such obligation varies over time and across communities, what
1Cf. Dunn (1993, pp. 37-38).
2Hume (1911, vol. 2, p.128); quoted in Dunn (1993).
3Cf. Adam Smith (1976, pp. 136-137).
concerns us here is to see why and how it has prompted
environmental concerns that transcend borders and indeed weaken
the nation states' autonomy within their conventionally-domestic
jurisdict ions.
To see this with necessary nuance, one must understand that
obligation implies rights. If then transborder obligations to others
elsewhere are accepted, so must the notion that these others have
rights which we are expected to sustain.
It follows then that the assumption in international relations
since the Treaty of Wesphalia, that nation states have exclusive
domain over their subjects such that their treatment of these
subjects is a matter of domestic sovereignty and international
relations therefore must respect moral pluralism, is no longer
acceptable. As Raymond Plant (1993) has put it succinctly: The
principle of cuius regio euius religio may have been central to the
Treaty of Westphalia but the principle of cuius regio, eius jus is not
compatible with the idea that there are basic human rights the
moral authority of which crosses frontiers."
However, intervention on behalf of the subjects of other nation
states, following its legitimacy and the delegitimation of the
exclusive sovereignty of nation states over their subjects (in regard
to these subjects' rights that are regarded as following from our
obligation to them), runs into the very same difficulty that the
question of rights runs into in the domestic domain. In particular,
the problem of sustaining "positive" rights becomes pertinent and
di f f icu l t .
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Thus, "negative" rights such as the right to liberty create
obligations that could be described as consisting in refraining from
actions harmful to others. As such, they are considered to involve
indirect costs in the sense of foregone gains (e.g. if I do not enslave
you, I do not get to exploit you and get rich) but they generally do not
involve direct costs (e.g. I can simply refrain from enslaving you).
Though, even this is not quite accurate since I may have to incur
direct costs to ensure that someone else does not deny you your
negative right, say to liberty (e.g. I may have to finance an army or a
police force to deter those who would otherwise force you into
slavery).
But these costs pale into insignificance when we consider the
enforcement of obligation to sustain positive rights, such as to
shelter, education, clean air, clean water, good health and indeed
much else.
This (relative) asymmetry has prompted many rights advocates
to attach greater significance to negative rights: habeas corpus
outweighs clean air, by this logic. Equally, it is widely thought that,
while negative rights can all be demanded of every nation state, this
cannot be the case with positive rights: the problem of costs means
that we have to choose between clean air and clean water.
These choices are resolved within the nation state in one way
or another. In pluralistic nations, they are resolved through debate
and politics; in authoritarian states, by fiat and possibly by neglect.
But, in either case, the problem of cost is implicitly or explicitly
recognized. By contrast, when the positive rights of others in the
jurisdiction of foreign nation states are defended, and these are
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pursued by demanding that these foreign nations (not one's own) find
the resources to sustain them, it does not take much ingenuity to
understand that the demands will tend to overreach and even to be
"captured" politically by interests in one's own state that have their
own agendas. Thus, overarching environmental demands on resource-
strapped nations, on threat of punitive trade sanctions, may be
made, not just by environmental groups, but by protectionist lobbies
who see the resulting possibility of trade sanctions as a benefit to
themselves.
Next, we must distinguish between the obligation that we feel
we owe others because they are part of humankind and the obligation
that we consider we owe to humanity itself. Thus, if environmental
obligations are at stake, we may regard Mexican citizens to be
entitled to clean air and clean water because they are human as we
in the US are and hence we may consider it our obligation to ensure
their access to such amenities. But then we may consider that the
depletion of the ozone layer imperils humanity itself and that we
must ensure therefore that Mexicans contribute, through
environmental measures, towards that survival. Interestingly, both
kinds of obligation can lead to the use by environmentalists of the
power of their own nation state to coerce other nation states,
through measures such as trade sanctions, into acceptance of
policies demanded of them.
(i). What We Owe Others: It was precisely the sense of
obligation to others that led the great developmental economists in
the postwar period, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and Gunnar Myrdal among
them, to seek foreign aid commitments by the rich nations (even
though, confronted by the realities of politics, they were reconciled
to "selling" foreign aid programs as good for the givers too, not as
yielding the pleasure of having done one's duty and discharged one's
obligation to others, but as enlightened self-interest in the shape of
"containing communism" during the Cold War). Obligation to others
then led to the imposition of obligation and sacrifice on one's own
government in the form of aid programs.
By contrast, in environmental matters, one's obligation to
others prompts demands on their government: the obligation to
others in Mexico, for their life chances as in the environmental
quality of their habitat, is seen as requiring that we in the United
States must use instrumentalities of various kinds to force the
Mexican government to ensure that its citizens enjoy a better
habitat.
Where therefore the aid question strengthened the legitimacy
of (one's) nation state by getting it to give aid (while imposing
greater demands on it and hence possibly weakening its eventual
legitimacy as an agency that could deliver efficaciously what is
required of it by those subject to its authority and whose interests
it advances), the environmental question weakens it by
delegitimating the notion that the (foreign) nation state, uncoerced
and by autonomous choice, will do well by its citizens.
Then again, we must recall that demands on one's own nation
state are different in important ways from demands on others'
nation state. Where, for instance, these demands need resources to
be spent, the former impose these burdens on oneself whereas the
latter impose them on others. Where therefore the former will be
moderated by the presence of resource constraints, the latter will
generally tend to assume larger proportions.
(ii). What We Owe to Humanity: But the question of our
obligation to humanity, to others of our species, appears to raise
different issues. The overriding obligation is evidently Hobbesian
and one of survival. Environmental questions such as the depletion
of the ozone layer and global warming clearly relate to obligation
maximorum of this variety. Though, even here, one must make room
for scientific opinion that suggests that the problems are slow to
intensify, leaving ample room for scientific innovation to
countervail the danger (much as Malthus has been held at bay to
date).
But, even if these environmental questions raise for us
compelling obligations to ensure the survival of humankind, the
issues that were considered earlier will resurrect themselves. For,
as soon as costs must be incurred to reach environmental targets
(setting which raises, in turn, its own host of issues), the question
cannot be evaded: which nation state must incur what costs?
"Efficient" solutions, as sophisticated economists know, are not
ethically appropriate solutions: being paid a market wage that
reflects an efficient economic system, for instance, is not to be
paid the just wage.1
1This is why the Cambridge economist, Joan Robinson, moved away in her later years
from her celebrated definition of "exploitation" as the payment of a wage less than a
worker's marginal product: to do so would be to concede implicitly that the market wage
was the just wage. Interestingly, the Nobel-laureate Robert Fogel and Stanley
Engerman, in their monumental study of slavery, appeared to share the Robinsonian
Thus, an efficient solution (which minimizes the world cost of reducing a unit of
CO2) to the global warming problem may require Brazil's rain forests to be not cut down
and no reduction in the use of gas-guzzlers on U.S. roads because the latter is a more
expensive solution (see Figure 1). But then ask Brazil to take the entire burden of
reducing global warming is to stick it with the bill: a most unjust outcome when you think
that the U.S. is a rich country and Brazil is less so. But the use of the U.S. economic
muscle, and the relative efficacy of the U.S.-based environmental groups in demanding
compliance from the poor nations elsewhere rather than from their own country where
they must fight with powerful groups that oppose them (witness the inability of President
Clinton to adopt the BTU tax), mean that the sense of obligation to humanity's survival
could translate into effective demands on others and their nation states that are unfair or
unjust in relation to demands on oneself and on one's own nation state. Indeed, it does.
(iii). Trade Suspension and Refusal to Liberalize Trade:
The assertion of transborder obligation by environmentalists, labor unions and others can
take two alternative forms in regard to trade with other nations: existing trade with, and
the trading rights of, other nations can be suspended or extension of trade through
further trade liberalization (as in NAFTA for Mexico) can be denied, unless these nations
bring their policies into conformity with one's demands.1








In the figure, the marginal cost of reducing CO2 in Brazil and in the
US are plotted. For a targetted reduction of OQ units of CO2, an
efficient cost-minimising solution requires that all reduction occur
in Brazil, with the striped area representing the total cost. Only for
targetted reduction of CO2 in excess of OR will it be efficient also
for the US to cut down CO2 emissions
Evidently, the former is the more difficult, partly because it
involves the suspension of a right already conceded by treaty or a
transaction already in place, and partly because it will result in
direct and noticeable impact on the economic interests of importers
who may be users of intermediates and can then become effective
adversaries of the proposed sanctions. By contrast, foregone trade
liberalization denies benefits that are only potential.
(iv). The Question of Consequential Ethics: In using either
trade sanctions or denial of trade liberalization to secure for others
their environmental and labour standards and other rights, the moral
motive remains the sense of (transborder) obligation. This, in turn,
implies that the use of these methods presupposes, on the part of
those who use them, a presumption that they will be effective in
securing the stated objectives.
However, that presumption itself cannot be assumed to be
always justified. If Mexico is forced to spend more on clean air than
it can currently afford, simply to be allowed to join NAFTA, then
this could compromise her ability to grow faster and then spend
more on clean air later. Or, getting Mexico to forego the use of the
more productive purse-seine nets to catch tuna could save more
dolphins but reduce productivity in the tuna industry and adversely
affect Mexican growth and her capacity to generate resources to
spend more on other environmental problems.
Then again, even the implementation of the threat to deny old
and new trading rights may not force Mexico into submission, thus
imposing costs on her and indeed on oneself that yield no gains in
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terms of the desired (environmental or other) objectives. A
consequential will then abandon the proposed trade measures.
But then one might well have those who feel that one should
not sup with the devil even though the only consequence of such
denial is that one misses a free meal. Duty, not consequentialism,
then drives such environmentalists into rejecting NAFTA with
Mexico if Mexico fails to fix her environmental standards as desired.
But then one is saying: my obligation to Mexicans requires that 1
seek to advance their corresponding rights; but if I cannot do so
effectively in reality (through trade measures), I nonetheless will
refuse to engage with their government in freer trade, expressing
my distaste and moral disapproval.1
11 suspect however that some of those who would profess this moral point of view are
likely, if you probe deeper, to be closet consequentialists. For, they would still hope
that the mere act of disapproval in a visible fashion, while producing immediate
intransigence by the targetted country, would prompt her eventually to consider
concessions instead.
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2.The Question of Distributive Justice
An important motivation for harmonization, however, is not concern for
others elsewhere but concern for the poor among us. Thus, if free trade with
poor countries with lower environmental and labor standards will, via
competitive pressures, drive down the real wages of our unskilled, then this
may be cause for making upward harmonization of these standards a
precondition for freeing of trade. This is evidently an argument for distributive
justice. Three different arguments of this type can be distinguished in the public
domain at the present time.
(i) Immiseration of Our Unskilled: The fear has certainly grown in the
countries of the (richer) North that free trade with the (poorer) countries of the
South will drive down the real wages of the unskilled in their midst. The growth
in unemployment in Europe in the 1980s, and the decline in real wages of the
unskilled in the United States during the same period, have fuelled these fears,
with globalization of the world economy through North-South trade
liberalization considered a villain and also a danger for the future.1 [Note that
this is not the longstanding "pauper labor" argument against free trade: that
relates to the notion that there will be no gains from trade if you trade with poor
1
 There is now a voluminous and growing literature on this subject. It has been reviewed, and
extended, in depth in Jagdish Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia (1993). The fear outlined in the text is
shown in this paper to be seriously exaggerated, possibly unfounded, if existing theories and
evidence are considered. However, new hypotheses are suggested as to how globalization of
the world economy through trade and diffusion of technology may exert a downward pressure on
real wages.
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countries with numerous paupers. Instead, the present argument says: free
trade will increase overall income but it will hurt income distribution, harming
our unskilled poor. Some may fear for both gains from trade and for real wages,
of course, and probably do! ]
This fear has led to demands from several labor unions, and from
politicians, to make raising of wages in the South a precondition for expanded
free trade. The most dramatic example of these demands was the debate
during the passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement through the
US Congress, when both the unions an d Ross Perot focused on the low wages
in Mexico as a reason to reject NAFTA and President Salinas of Mexico was
constrained in fact to advertise his commitment to raise minimum wages in
Mexico to smooth the passage of NAFTA.
Equally, it has contributed to the demands for environmental and labor
standards harmonization because this also is seen as raising the costs of
foreign competitors. This happens also to be the way in which President
Clinton, and certainly the US Trade Representative Mickey Kantor, presented
the Supplemental Agreements on these matters with Mexico: as measures
which would prevent "unfair trade" with Mexico under NAFTA.2 They
legitimated, in consequence, the notion that free trade with the countries of the
South required such agreements as "fair trade" preconditions.
(ii) Capital Mobility's Consequences : When capital mobility is
introduced, the fear about distributive justice is accentuated. As the NAFTA
debate made clear, the fear then extends to capital flowing out to where the
wages, labor and environmental standards are lower, thus leaving less capital
to work with labor at home and thus reducing the real wages of labor (even if
2
 The agreements are, as it happens, quite innocuous; I am talking about how they were
actually presented and thought of by the Clinton administration.
the outflow of capital enriches the country overall).3
(iii)Distributive Justice Abroad: Strange as it may seem, some anti-free-
trade critics also fear that real wages at both ends will fall as a result of free
trade. In that case, the distributive-justice argument blends into moral obligation
towards others. Thus, in the NAFTA debate, it was customary to allege that even
the Mexican workers would suffer from free trade.
Was this total nonsense? I would have to say: almost certainly. While
freer trade, without induced capital flows, would help improve Mexican wages,
the outcome would be even better with induced capital flows into Mexico.For
the same reason that capital outflows from the US to Mexico could hurt US
workers, they would benefit the Mexican workers.4 [In the end, both countries
could gain capital was that non-NAFTA capital, from the European Union and
Japan in particular, would likely flow in far greater magnitude to the region once
NAFTA was formed. The European Community experience with the entry of
Spain fits this pattern: both Spain and the United Kingdom benefited, the former
from EC and the latter from non-EC sources.5 So, even US real wages could
benefit from the induced capital flows resulting from NAFTA.
The concern with workers abroad goes beyond their real wages in
employment. The fear is that free trade will lead to industrial employment of
erstwhile peasants in industrial employment where their interests will be
sacrificed and workers immiserized unless protections via enforced, superior
3
 This form of argumentation leads also to an alternative scenario, that the effect of such
pressures, and the competitive pressures on our industries, will be to cut away at our own
environmental and labor standards, producing a "race to the bottom". This argument is
considered later in the present paper.
4
 It is hard to understand why the anti-NAFTA critics thought that Mexican workers would be
harmed. They were focusing on the "exploitation" and "low wages" which were supposedly "not
reflecting productivity", inferring incorrectly that this implied that the change in wages following
NAFTA would be adverse.
5
 My Columbia student, Rupa Chanda (1993), has shown this fairly persuasively in her
dissertation.
labor standards are provided. Underlying this view, I believe, is the notion that
peasants will have regret but be unable to move back to the land if immiseration
occurs: as in Brusati's celebrated film, Bread and Chocolate , where the
immigrant qastarbeiter from Italy is trapped into his miserable condition in
Switzerland and unable to return home. I doubt however that this is a
sufficiently likely occurrence to deny freer trade and its advantages to the poor
nations of the South without upward harmonization of their labor standards.
3. The Question of Fairness
Another compelling argument for harmonization proceeds from the
altogether different philosophical notion of "fairness".6 It might fairly be said that
"fairness" and legitimacy in terms thereof of the process within which
competition for economic success takes place is a central American value,
whereas "justice" and legitimacy instead in terms of the distribution of success
is a central European value. In turn, perhaps, this contrast reflects the uniquely
different, egalitarian nature of the American society built on free immigration
and the traditional, hierarchical nature of European society. Equality of access
matters in the United States, equality of success in Europe.
The use of fairness is thus a central feature of the demands in the United
States for harmonization. Naturally enough, since fairness like beauty is in the
eyes of the beholder and also because the United States is a major player in
trade negotiations whether multilateral or bilateral, it follows that the American
demands also tend to seek to remake the world in its own image. As Suzanne
Berger has said well:7
"Americans believe that productivity growth must be based upon
legitimate practices in production. . The gains that accrue to producers are
8
 Cf. Bhagwati (1991) where the rise of fair trade demands, as a threat to the world trading
system, was first discussed and some of the explanatory factors analyzed.
7
 Berger (1993, page 2).
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legitimate only if they come from legitimate economic arrangements. Gains from
sweated or prison labor are seen as legitimate gains. I think that in the
American debate, the argument over the legitimacy of the keiretsu is essentially
one about whether they should be seen as a form of network organization, in
which case they are legitimate and perhaps to be imitated. Or whether the
keiretsu are organizations in which large firms beat up on their subcontractors
who, in turn, beat up on their workers, in which case they ought to be reformed
or eliminated through international pressures. Gains in trade are thus seen as
fair to the extent that they are based on national practices which are themselves
fair and legitimate. Such debates propel other nations' practices into the center
of the international agenda."
The demands for harmonization that ensue from notions of fairness
extend to competition in one's own markets (i.e. they relate to one's imports ) or
in others' markets (i.e. they relate to one's exports), the latter, in turn, dividing
into one's exports to another country's own market or to third markets. Thus, the
United States may make fairness claims, and indeed makes them, about
Japan's exports to the US market, US exports to Japan's market, and shares of
US and Japan in exports to third markets.
Thus, the fairness claims about imports have conventionally related to
unfair uses of subsidies and the unfair private practice of (allegedly predatory)
dumping. Uses of countervailing duties (CVDs) against unfair subsidies and of
anti-dumping (AD) duties have long been sanctioned by national and GATT-
legitimated practice. These unfairness claims are now being extended,
especially to environmental and labor standards. The argument is that it is
unfair competition if your rival in an industry faces lower burdens than one
does, because of differential standards. The implied norm of fairness seems to
be simply that , no matter what the economic and other justifications for the
existence of such differential standards (and, as I shall note later, there certainly
are compelling ones), they evidently constitute a lack of symmetry in the
environment faced by competing firms in the industry in different nations and
hence ipso facto are unacceptable.
In a penetrating analysis of the norms of fairness underlying the claims
regarding unfairness in exports to others1 markets, as reflected in the legislative
debates and content of successive versions of Section 301 of US trade law,
which authorizes retaliatory action by the US against unfair foreign trade
practices affecting US exports, Ken Abbott (1993) has distinguished among (I)
the norm of adherence to international commitments and law8, (2) the norm of
nullification or impairment of previous trade concessions or agreements9 , (3)
the norm of non-discrimination10, (4) the norm of reciprocity11 , and (5) the norm
of the free market12. There is little doubt that the panoply of these norms,
legitimating in the eyes of the US complainants in industry and in the Congress
the view of foreign practices as unfair and hence actionable, has fuelled
significantly the growth in demands for harmonization, i.e. for removal of those
practices and to thus harmonize other countries' domestic policies and
practices in a variety of areas closer to those of the United States.
8
 Abbott means by this the claim that a foreign practice violates an accepted commitment,
whether at the GATT multilaterally or in bilateral and plurilateral treaties. Evidently, this is the fairest
norm! The only, and critical, question it raises is: what procedure is used to establish that a
commitment has been violated.
9
 This differs from violation of agreements in the sense that it is not a direct, explicit violation
but an indirect de facto violation. Thus, if I see you a house and deny you possession, that is a
violation. But if build a moat around it, over which I have control and you do not, that is tantamount
to nullifying my contract and your rights indirectly. Article XXIII of the GATT addresses both types of
denial of a Contracting Party's rights.
10
 This norm is prominent in the GATT, of course. Abbott considers several cases where the
US complainants to the US Trade Representative's office cited discriminatory practices, whether
covered by treaty or not, as inherently unfair. These practices discriminated against US firms in
favour of domestic firms (the socalled "national treatment" being denied) or in favour of other
foreign firms.
11
 This simply matches what we face with what you face. Non-discrimination is clearly
compatible with lack of reciprocity. Abbott distinguishes among different notions of reciprocity as
revealed by the legislative debates.
12
 By this, Abbott means that a practice is considered unfair because it distorts market
outcomes. As I argued earlier in my book, Protectionism (1988). the economic-philosophical basis
for free trade is the Darwinian process: markets should determine outcomes. If trade practices
distort that process, then their legitimacy is at a discount; unfairness ensues. Abbott discusses
practices such as foreign targeting of industries for support as one such unfair practice in the US
debates and in the 1988 legislation.
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II. STRUCTURAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY
The economic (as distinct from the philosophical) arguments for
harmonization have arisen from a variety of reasons. Among the principal ones,
we must consider structural changes in the world economy. These can be
divided into (i) those that are specific to the United States and arise from a
sense of relative decline in the world economy, what I have called the
"diminished giant syndrome"; and (ii) those that are more general and afflict
several economies simultaneously, producing similar reactions internationally.
I. The Diminished Giant Syndrome
The two decades, 1970s and 1980s, witnessed in the United States the
rise of the "diminished giant syndrome": a relative decline in her share of world
GNP and trade as the nations of the Pacific, especially Japan, became major
players in the world economy, and with it a sense, and hence a syndrome, of
absolute decline as well.13
This set a historical parallel with the end of the I9th century in Britain
where the rise of Germany and the United States as major players in the world
economy had also disconcerted many.
In both countries, the reaction was similar. Free trade without reciprocity
was decried. In Britain, Fair Trade Leagues and Reciprocity Associations grew
up just as the US Congress was seized with similar concerns with
13
 See, in particular, Bhagwati (1988).
nonreciprocal and unfair access to her markets by her rivals.14 In the British
case, of course, this nonreciprocity was indeed a reality as Britain had long
been a unilateral free trader in ideology and in policy since the repeal of the
Corn Laws by Prime Minister Robert Peel in I846. In the case of the United
States, which had never accepted unilateral free trade, the belief in her
openness while others were closed was exaggerated, though held with great
conviction.
Declinism has thus fed, for sure, the ethos in the United States in favour
of reciprocal openness. In turn, it has also legitimated demands for fair trade or
"level playing fields", prompting great concerns in policymaking with whether
the newly successful trading rivals are "cheating" or gaining advantage in
competition that is simply unfair.15 The willingness to play by the rules of free
trade has always been easier, as economic historians have observed, for
countries that expect to win from Darwinian competition; declinism cuts into that
optimism and sets up roadblocks such as demands for fair trade that will, in the
guise of demands for level playing fields, in fact gain oneself the higher ground.
Then again, the fact that the foreign nations which had emerged as
strong rivals were in the Far East [ though Lester Thurow (I993) would have us
confront the European Community and Germany as even more fearsome
rivals, a diagnosis that looks increasingly unpersuasive), was a contributory
factor.
Now, the British were not exactly sympathetic to the Germans, for sure,
and the rise of the United States, a former colony that had chosen the way of
14
 The parallels and contrasts between the British and the American cases have been
developed at length in Bhagwati and Irwin (I987).
15
 Since cheating or unfair trade in foreign countries' practices, including many domestic
practices, cannot be alleged if they do what we do, evidently a great number of these objections
translate into demands for the foreign nations doing what we do, i.e. into demands for
harmonizing their domestic practices with ours.
war and independence, may have been grating too. But, in the case of the
United States today, with its generosity towards rebuilding Japan after the
Second World War, and her support for Japan's entry into the GATT in the teeth
of European objections, resentment of Japan's success does not appear to
have been a problem. Rather, the fact that Japan's internal economic and social
culture made the penetration of the Japanese market difficult relative to others
because of its long history of "controlled openness", and the view since the
1930s that Japan was a predatory exporter which could not be allowed to play
trade by rules but had to be continually restrained by quotas on her exports,
combined to give credence to the perception that trade with Japan could not be
left to the rules of free trade. Instead, fair trade and reciprocity, carried to the
length of guaranteed results in terms of expanded imports (Voluntary Import
Expansions) and reduced exports (Voluntary Export Restraints) , had to be
imposed on Japan.
2. Globalization of the World Economy
The demands for fair trade have also come from structural changes in the
world economy which afflict several nations simultaneously and in similar
fashion.
(i) Kaleidoscopic Comparative Advantage: Chief among them is the fact
that, increasingly, the integration of the world economy has made several more
industries footloose than ever before, facing fierce competition with a much-
reduced cushion for their competitive edge vis-a-vis their rivals abroad. Let me
explain why.
The research of the economists Will Baumol, Susan Blackman and Ed
Wolff has shown that technological knowhow has converged significantly
among the OECD countries in the postwar period through the 1970s. The
economist Richard Nelson has argued persuasively that today much
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technology can be easily accessed simply by having skilled personnel with the
necessary scientific training from the universities; hence some of the frantic
search for patent rights (to secure royalties, not to prevent dissemination).
Multinationals have also become ubiquitous: they mutually penetrate each
others' turf, so that Servan -Schreiber's American Challenge (to Europe)
yesterday could be the Tolchins' Japanese Challenge (to the US) today.16 At the
same time, the developed world's capital markets are more closely integrated
than before, though the tendency of domestic savings to mimic domestic
investment has not been greatly dented.17
The net result is that several industries can be readily competed for by
many developed countries, with comparative advantage rather fragile, so that
the advantage anyone enjoys in any such industry is of a knife edge variety.
Comparative advantage in these industries then is kaleidoscopic : it will
move across countries almost randomly. In the old jargon, these industries are
"footloose".18
In this situation, you can fairly expect those who are investing in and
managing these industries to be extremely sensitive to any possibility of an
"unfair" advantage gained by their foreign rivals: the slightest advantage
enjoyed by them becomes suspect because it can be fatal. This implies then
that demands will be made, both for zero-tariff or mutually-identical tariff options
and for NTB matching among countries, as also for harmonization of any
elements of domestic policies and institutions that might be considered to give
one's rivals an edge in competition.
16
 That there could be mutual, direct foreign investment (DFI) in two advanced countries was
first noted by Stephen Hymer (1976). That such mutually-penetrating investment (MPI) would
increasingly take place within the same industry , as it has amply done since, was noted and
theorized about in Bhagwati's (1972) review of Raymond Vernon's (1971) Sovereignty at Bay.
17
 On this issue, see the fine survey by Jeff Frenkel (1993).
18
 The concept and phrase, kaleidoscopic comparative advantage, were developed in
Bhagwati (1991 b) and have been elaborated further in Bhagwati and Dehejia (1993).
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(ii) Exchange Rates:
Yet another reason why sensitivity to differences in domestic policies and
institutions by trading rivals has increased might appear to be the shift to a
regime of exchange rate flexibility. However, the shift is to a dirty float and
exchange rate volatility is not as pronounced as feared by the proponents of
fixed exchange rates. Nor is there any evidence that the shift to flexible
exchanges rates , in any event, has reduced significantly the volume of trade
transactions19.
A more persuasive case instead might be made for the argument that
serious overvaluation of a currency could, by making the tradeable sectors
highly uncompetitive, fuel their demands for harmonization to moderate the
winds of competition in open economies. It may be no coincidence that the rise
of fair trade concerns and associated demands for harmonization reached a
higher level of political viability during the 1980s when the dollar was
substantially overvalued and protectionism was rampant in the Congress.
See the work of Alexander Swoboda, for instance, on this subject:
III. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY
The economic arguments against diversity arise principally from concern
with the following question: does the case for mutually-gainful trade between
voluntarily trading nations, which is at the heart of the case for free trade,
survive if there is diversity in domestic policies and institutions among them? In
short, instead of mutual gains from trade, could we get predation for a trading
nation if such diversity persists under free trade? Or, since relative gains from
trade can also be an issue, one may also ask the related question: even if
predation is not inflicted on oneself, does diversity reduce one's absolute or
relative gains from trade?20
1. The Nullification Idea and Problem:
But prior to discussing this range of problems, I should mention that the
the analysis and institutional organization of free trade (as at the GATT) have
always reflected a concern with the domestic policies of the trading nations
(though not with harmonization thereof, except in a fundamental sense that I
spell out below). This is because economists have recognized that the effects of
trade policies can be nullified or impaired (to use GATT phraseology) by
20
 These questions, discussed below, were raised in Bhagwati (I99lc) in a paper which
provided the analytical guidelines for the economist participants for the Bhagwati-Hudec Ford
Foundation project, op.cit.
domestic actions.
(i) The Idea of Equivalence: Thus, economists are aware that imposing a
tariff on a commodity is equivalent to imposing instead a consumption tax on it
and giving a subsidy to domestic producers of it. For, the tariff raises prices to
consumers and for producers: both effects can be directly achieved by the mix
of a consumption tax and a producer subsidy. This is just one of many
"equivalence" propositions that the students of international economics are
alerted to by their teachers.21
It immediately follows that any trade concessions can be nullified by
imposing an offsetting set of domestic policies. No institutional arrangement that
oversees and then monitors trade liberalization can afford therefore to confine
its rules and attention to "border" measures. There follows therefore the notion
that an institution such as the GATT must have a nullification or impairment
clause, as indeed Article XXIII is, to examine complaints that trade concessions
have been offset by domestic policies. I should imagine therefore that the
inclusion of Article XXIII into the GATT at the very outset was approved, perhaps
even suggested, by the distinguished economists associated with its design,
chief among them the British Nobel laureate, James Meade.
(ii) The "Systemic" Problem: Markets Matter: But the question of
nullification or impairment turns into a "system" question of far more
overarching range when we confront the fact that the way an economy is
organised, it simply cannot be expected to offer trade concessions that can be
translated into meaningful commitments of market access. Let me raise four
specific areas where this question has become significant, inside and outside
the GATT: (a) State trading; (b) Trade with the former centrally planned
21
 See, for instance, the graduate-level textbook by Bhagwati and Srinivasan (1983, Chapter
15). Equivalences on one dimension, however, do not always translate into equivalence on other
dimensions.
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economies (CPEs); (c) Trade with the developing countries; and (d) Trade with
Japan.
In each case, the main burden of the concerns voiced by Contracting
Parties, and of the demands for corrective action, has related to the
presumption that markets matter. If markets do not function adequately because
of specific domestic institutions (such as State trading) or the entire domestic
economic system (such as that characterizing a CPE), then free trade by rules
as contemplated by the GATT system would fail to produce the desired gains
from trade.
(a) State Trading: GATT, and economists supporting free trade, presume
that "trading enterprises will act on commercial considerations and that the
economic theories of comparative advantage will lead these enterprises to
extend their international trade in order to reap its benefits".22
The architects of the ITO had been concerned with the fact that State
trading needed to be regulated in some fashion if it was to be made tolerably
compatible with a rules-based system of free trade that would let firms compete
meaningfully for markets whose access had been obtained by tariff
concessions. Article XVII of the GATT eventually carried over two of the original
three provisions in the US ITO proposals, including the requirement that State
trading organizations be operated in a nondiscriminatory manner.
Eventually, a 1955 Working Party recommended amendments to Article
XVII which were adopted in 1955 and were made effective in 1957. As noted by
Jackson (1969), other provisions of the GATT also address the issues raised by
State trading organizations: among them, Article II, paragraph 4, and
Interpretative Notes relating to Articles XI through XIV and article XVIII.
Provisions relating to all other governmental activity also bear on the GATT
22
 Cf. Jackson (1969, p.33O).
obligations imposed on State trading organizations.23 The exemptions to the
State trading obligation, originally permitted for "imports of products for
immediate or ultimate consumption in governmental use and not otherwise for
re-sale or use in the production of goods for sale", have subsequently been
brought under discipline in the Tokyo Round Procurement Code and
subsequent negotiations.
(b) Centrally Planned Economies: Jackson (1969, p.36l) has well said: "If
the existence of state enterprises in an economy that generally follows a free
enterprise system poses... problems [for the GATT], consider the problem
posed by an economy that is entirely or largely operated by state enterprises !"
In fact, the accommodation of the erstwhile socialist countries into the GATT
system posed considerable difficulty that surfaced again when the Soviet
Union, under Mr. Gorbachev, sought GATT entry and have appeared also in the
matter of China's reentry into the GATT.
From the beginning, however, the Contracting Parties were torn between
the desire to make the GATT as inclusive in membership as possible and the
difficulty of accommodating (into a rules-based markets-presupposing
international organization) countries whose economic and political organization
was clearly based on nonmarket principles. France, with its attachment to
dirigisme, expressed the inclusive principle best through its delegate at the
drafting session in I94624:
France wishes to see that the organization which we are planning here
extends to the rest of the world... There does not exist, in our opinion, any
necessary connection between the form of the productive regime and the
internal exchanges in one nation, on the one hand, and on her foreign
economic policy on the other. The United States may very well continue to
23
 See the detailed discussion in Jackson (1969, Chapter 14), especially Section 14.3, pp.336-
339.
24
 The following discussion, and quotes, come from Jackson (1969, pp. 361-364).
follow the principle, the more orthodox principle, of private initiative. France and
other European countries may turn towards planned economy. The USSR may
uphold and maintain the Marxist ideals of collectivism without our having to
refuse to be in favor of a policy of international organization based on liberty
and equality....
Given the triumphalism that attends market-based capitalism today, the French
characterization of the American preference for private initiative as "orthodox",
and the indulgence towards the USSR for its Marxist ideals, seems ironic,
indeed. But the French statement captures pretty well the general feeling that
the world was and would continue to be diverse in the methods chosen to
organize national economies, and that the GATT should try to accommodate
somehow the socialist nations.
Indeed, the US position at the discussions on the ITO and at the GATT
was precisely to find formulas to do so. The solution to the problem of defining
market access obligations meaningfully, when markets did not exist in socialist
countries, was to go for what we call today "results-oriented", "managed trade",
quantitative import obligations in the context of the "Japan problem". Thus, the
United States, in its suggested draft of the ITO Charter, suggested that
countries with a "complete or substantially complete monopoly of its import
trade" (which would include all socialist countries, of course) should conclude
agreements undertaking "to import in the aggregate over a period products of
the other Members valued at not less than an amount to be agreed
upon...subject to periodic adjustment".
As it happened, this technique was used subsequently in defining the
obligations of socialist countries acceding to the GATT. Thus, when Poland
entered the GATT in 1967, having negotiated its entry during the Kennedy
Round, the Schedule for Poland carried the obligation "to increase the total
value of its imports from the territories of contracting parties by not less than 7
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per cent per annum".
Of course, the early socialist states in the GATT were Czechoslovakia
(which had long joined the GATT before it fell to communism), Yugoslavia
(which joined in 1966) and Poland. The latter two were not of importance in
world trade. With the Soviet Union and China, the issue was far more potent,
given the enormous size and trade potential of the two countries, raising the
question of their GATT entry into a qualitatively different phenomenon. The
condition of entry would then shift from quantitative import obligations (whose
meaningfulness has been challenged effectively in the Japan context by
several economists) to a demonstrated commitment to, even successful
transition to, markets by these countries.
(c) Developing Countries: The Special & Differential (S&D) Treatment
accorded to the developing countries at the GATT amounted to a virtual
exemption of these countries from many of the disciplines and norms of the
GATT. S&D followed from the postwar theoretical presumption that developing
countries were subject to modified economic principles, subsumed under the
title of Development Economics, such that they had to be treated differently as a
class in international economic arrangements.
Thus, it was not that these countries were not working with markets. It
was that the market principles did not apply effectively, given the institutional
structures characterizing these countries. Thus, for instance, they had endemic
balance of payments problems which required them to work without even
current account convertibility, so that import restrictions for balance-of-payments
reasons were necessary. But this meant in turn that the developing countries
could not be expected to offer real market access to other Contracting Parties at
the GATT: the use of Article XVIII (b), permitting the use of trade restrictions for
payments reasons temporarily became, in effect, a permanent matter,
constituting an open door through which all developing countries could walk
out.
Aside from this economic-theoretic legitimation of S&D treatment of the
developing countries, S&D also made political sense in much the same way as
the permitted entry into the GATT of the socialist countries did.Developing
countries were just not important enough to make much difference to the
developed countries, leading them to concede demands for S&D, including
lack of reciprocity in trade concessions, without much fuss.
Evidently, in both regards, views have changed dramatically in recent
years. Developing countries are much bigger players in world trade today and
few developed countries are willing to grant S&D today, except to the countries
truly at the bottom of the pecking order, the socalled "least developed
countries". But, more importantly, economic theory no longer considers
developing countries to be "off the curve", requiring a different kind of
economics to understand them and to prescribe suitable policies for them. In
particular, it is now thought that current account convertibility can be achieved
far more quickly than was thought to be the case earlier. Witness for instance
the recommendations being made towards this end to the former socialist
countries in light of the new thinking: where the war-ravaged Europe was
guided to convertibility over a decade by economists such as Robert Triffin, and
developing countries remained on inconvertible currencies for decades in the
postwar period, Poland, Russia and others are being advised to go convertible
overnight ! Regardless of the soundness of such advice — and the abysmal
failure of "shock therapy" in Russia is a useful reminder that economists can go
dramatically wrong —, the fact remains that modern economic thinking does not
admit any longer that developing countries have a unique inability to shift to
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macro policies that can restore convertibility to the current account so that trade
policy can then be "assigned" GATT-style, not to address balance-of-payments
concerns, but to offer rules-based market access and thus to generate the
resulting gains from trade both for themselves and for their trading partners.
In fact, today, if the NAFTA negotiations by the United States are any
guide, we may well be entering a new era of "reverse S&D" because of the fear
(discussed by me in Section I) that trade with the poor countries could hurt the
real wages of the unskilled in the rich countries. This fear led to attempts at
enforcing minimum wage increases and upgrading of environmental standards
(and hence costs) in Mexico that had no parallel in the earlier negotiations with
Canada (except that it was in Canada that certain groups had unsuccessfully
worried about differences in social legislation between Canada and the US as
yielding the US "unfair" advantage); and Mexico had to accept trade sanctions
as the ultimate recourse by the US in case of violations of environmental
standards whereas Canada successfully rejected this. This asymmetry of
obligations, tougher for Mexico than for Canada, may set a pattern that is
indeed tantamount to seeking greater obligations for free trade from the
developing countries than from the developed.
(d) The "Japan Problem": The question of nullification or impairment
because markets do not function as required to make trade concessions
meaningful has emerged most dramatically in regard to trade with Japan,
however.
The belief that the Japanese market is closed because of "informal" trade
barriers that reduce effective market access is held with sufficient conviction to
have led the EC to initiate an unsuccessful GATT complaint under Article 23
against Japan (as distinct from a complaint against a specific Japanese industry
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or sector). It has also led the Clinton administration to attempt a politically
supercharged shift in its Japan policy to impose managed-trade quantitative
import targets, VIEs (Voluntary Import Expansions), in several sectors such as
vehicles and autoparts.
These VIEs are possibly a substitute for the earlier attempts by the Bush
and previous administrations to use the Structural Impediments Initiative (SII) to
impose changes in Japan's domestic institutions and policies, more in line with
those of the United States, in the expectation that such harmonization would
make Japan's markets more accessible, indeed as accessible as those of the
United States. But the demands for VIEs may also be seen as a tactical device
to extract such harmonization as a more acceptable option for Japan to seize in
negotiations. That differences in Japan's domestic institutions and policies
amount to making Japan an "unfair" trader is, of course, an assertion that is
commonly made in US Congress and by industrial lobbies.
Of course, the critics of Japan consider the problem with Japan to arise
not merely in regard to access to her markets. More traditionally, they have
focused also on her exports, considering Japanese business practices to be
predatory (and hence a natural target for anti-dumping actions). This view is
further reinforced by the view that Japan's government, through MITI, targets
unfairly specific foreign industries for massive onslaught. Moreover, modern
theory has provided greater legitimacy for the view that, by keeping her markets
closed, Japan gives unfair advantage to her producers in high-tech sectors
where scale economies are important, since Japanese producers enjoy access
to both their own and others' markets while others are kept confined to their
own markets. Thus, import protection can lead to export promotion:
comparative advantage is shifted unfairly towards Japan in such industries.25
Of course, these beliefs are not necessarily justified simply because
many hold them, any more than the Jewish people are wicked simply because
many anti-semites through the centuries have believed them to be. Indeed,
serious examinations of these questions throw considerable doubt on the
probity of such accusations.
2. Gains from Trade:
Whereas the demands for harmonization come then from the sense that
otherwise the trade concessions granted by others will be nullified or impaired,
the economist must recognize a different kind of argument that also drives such
demands.
This comes from the sense that , whereas the conventional economic
view is that free trade between nations is to their mutual advantage, amounting
to a positive-sum game, this need not be so when these nations have different
domestic institutions and policies behind their borders. That, predation could,
often would, follow instead.
Alternatively, even if mutuality of gain is conceded, the fear is that the
absence of harmonization will create an unfavorable distribution of the gains
from trade. This is a less stark view of the matter: but, as political scientists
continually remind economists, relative gains are arguably the more important
bone of contention in international conflict and cooperation.
If we examine the earliest debates on harmonization, in the context of
25
 This is an old argument, made well by Richard Pomfret(l9 ) for example. It has been
revived, in the context of modern developments in the theory of imperfect competition, by Paul
Krugman (198 ), Both authors use the phrasing that import protection leads to export promotion.
For an alternative way in which this may happen, even when scale economies are not present, see
Bhagwati (198 ).
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policymaking and alongside among international economists, these arose in
the case of the European Community and in relation to the question of tax
harmonization, as one would expect.26 Interestingly, the dominant view among
the economists who led the discussion at the time — and these included the
future Nobel laureates, Jan Tinbergen of Netherlands and Bertil Ohlin of
Sweden —- was that diversity of tax policy among the member states of the EC
was compatible with mutual gains from trade. Thus, Reddaway (1958, pp.72-73)
argued, citing the difficulty of proving things theoretically but resorting to "some
simple facts, which at least give general presumption that harmonization of
taxation and social charges [ as demanded by the French ] is not
indispensable":
"This country [UK] had a regime of free trade for many years, the Benelux
countries are not so very far away from it now — they are much nearer to free
trade, for example, than to the position of France. Under each of these sets of
circumstances — and it is the ones when barriers were low that are most
relevant — tax systems and tax levels have differed greatly from one country to
another, but this has not prevented international trade from flourishing and
bringing great benefits to participants. One might indeed press this argument
further, and say that the European countries have, in the last eight years or so,
taken very important steps through the OEEC liberalization program to reduce
the barriers to European trade: few would deny that the expansion of this trade
has been very beneficial, despite the extremely varied taxes which the
countries impose. In a sense the onus of proof is on those who would argue that
further reductions of barriers require an elaborate harmonization of taxes....
Secondly, let us note that in cases [e.g.Benelux] which are broadly
analogous to the [European] Free Trade Area tax systems have not been
harmonised....Similarly, in Federal countries like Australia, Canada or the
U.S.A., the various States or Provinces show significant differences in their
taxes, but trade between them is universally regarded as beneficial."
Similarly, Ohlin (1965, pp.83) challenged the "firm belief" in some
quarters that "it is not possible to eliminate duties on trade among a large
See, for instance, the excellent discussion in Johnson, Wonnacott and Shibata (1967).
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number of countries if one does not at the same time bring about a real
economic integration, by means of a harmonization of economic and social
policy in general":
"It is not possible to "harmonize" the climate; yet international trade can
run smoothly...Trade will adapt itself to differences in the social and financial
milieu in the same way it does to differences in climate....there is no prima facie
case for harmonization of the tax system in general."27
But if these economists were assertive about domestic diversity being
compatible with mutual gains from trade, I detect signs of their admitting that
more harmonization could increase the total gains from trade. The question of
the distribution of the increased gains from trade was left unraised.26 Later
analyses, as in Shoup (1967), were sharper and did focus better on the
theoretical aspects of tax harmonization in the context of trade liberalization
such as in the EC: their analysis going so far as to discuss the problem as being
symmetric to the question of removal of tariffs themselves, with the concepts of
trade diversion and trade creation applied to the effects of domestic tax
differences and changes.
Today, of course, the skepticism about the possibility of mutual gains from
trade despite diversity in many domestic policies, tax and otherwise, has vastly
increased. The presumption of predation from free trade in the absence of
harmonization is sufficiently widespread to mark a radical change in attitudes
on the question. It has become therefore a key question for economists to
analyze in regard to different areas of domestic policy, such as environmental,
"Ohlin's analysis is richer than the quotes above indicate, also extending to questions of
international capital mobility.
281 base this conclusion on reading Reddaway (1958) and Ohlin (1965), in particular. Reddaway
was also a member of the Tinbergen Committee which reported on this question to the EC.
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labor and competition policies.
Thus, the questions I distinguished above, about predation and about the
relative gains from trade, need to be analytically addressed, so that the virtues
and vices of diversity are understood better by economists in terms of their own
methods of evaluating the social desirability of alternative policies.29
IV. POLITICAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST DIVERSITY
Finally, there is a class of arguments against diversity which can
be described as belonging conventionally to the political domain. They come
from protection-seeking: the protectionist demands are more effectively made
when unfair competition, based on (unreasonable) diversity abroad, is alleged.
Equally, environmentalist and labor groups are agitated that free trade, given
domestic political economy, will pull down domestic standards when lower
foreign standards are claimed to be putting one's industry at disadvantage,
producing a "race to the bottom". Then again, harmonization demands arise in
the context of political integration such as that desired in the European Union.
Just as in federal nation states such as India, Canada and the United States,
demands are then made for a common set of social standards, not because
they are essential for economic reasons but because political integration
requires that each State should have at least a minimum set of standards, as in
a Social Charter, in common among themselves.
29
 Therefore , these are the "core" questions being addressed by the economists on the
Bhagwati-Hudec project, op.cit.
I. Protection-seeking:
Two arguments may be distinguished.
(i)Eased Supply of Protection: If one thinks of actual protection as
emerging from the interaction of those who demand protection (e.g. unions and
firms in import-competing industries) and those who supply it (i.e. the
Administration and the Congress/Parliament ), then it is manifest that the
supply would be eased if, instead of simply saying that you were under
pressure from foreign competition and that you needed protection, you said: the
foreigners are succeeding because they compete unfairly.30
The use of traditional "unfair trade" mechanisms, the anti-dumping and
countervailing duties (offsetting foreign subsidies) processes, has obviously
increased through the 1980s for this, among other reasons. But the objection to
all sorts of differences in domestic policies and institutions in foreign countries
has also been fuelled by this protectionist ploy. For example, the large numbers
of complaints against Japan, a successful trading rival, under the SI I are to be
explained, partly at least, in this fashion. Either these complaints lead to
capitulation and consequent hoped-for increase in the production costs of
one's rivals. Else, these demands would be rejected, or informally
accommodated in negotiations but without being seriously implemented, in
which case the ethos that foreigners are indeed wickedly unfair and
untrustworthy would be intensified, making the support of protection
correspondingly easier for Congressmen who otherwise espouse free trade.
(ii) The Law of Constant Protection: In addition, the use of unfair trade
complaints as a way of securing protection may be simply a substitute for the
old-fashioned use of trade and quota barriers that came down with successive
multilateral barrier reductions under GATT auspices in several Rounds such as
See the discussion in Bhagwati (1991 a).
the recently-concluded Uruguay Round. Economists have thus speculated that
there may be a Law of Constant Protection: you stop protection in one form and
it props up in some other form elsewhere.31
2. Standards at Bay:" Race to the Bottom":
But the most potent political argument leading to demands for upwards
harmonization has been in regard to environmental and labor standards as a
precondition for free trade. This argument, often characterized as a "race to the
bottom" where different jurisdictions, either local in federal nations or different
countries, wind up competing with one another for industry which would
otherwise be feared to gravitate to where the standards are the lowest at the
outset.32 Looked at differently, free trade is supposed to lead to harmonization
downwards from below. To prevent it, harmonization upwards from the top is
demanded by the environmentalists and the labor groups before trade is
liberalized with developing countries.
The problem of harmonization downwards can arise from simply trade. It
is usually considered, however, in the context of international capital mobility. It
is feared then that entrepreneurs will simply close existing plants in the de
veloped countries and move to the poor countries where the standards are
lower. The latter problem is the more difficult politically. For, when factories
close and the workers and their communities know where the factory has been
transplanted abroad, the negative psychological reaction is more focused than
when your job is lost to general competition from trade with many different
31
 See the formulation of this Law in Bhagwati (1988). Recent, unpublished research by Ed
Mansfield of Columbia University, using a mass of cross-country data, provides support for this
Law.
32
 There is a vast literature in both economics and in law on this problem by now. See, in
particular, the legal writings of Stewart (1977a) (1977b) and Revesz (1992), and the economic
writings of Tiebout (1956), Buchanan and Goetz (1972), Oates and Schwab (1988), and Wilson
(1993) for the Bhagwati-Hudec project, op.cit
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countries. The "hiding hand" of the market that prevents you from knowing who
and presumably what caused your loss of a job, in your factory, tends to diffuse
the resentment, I think: and this advantage disappears when a furniture factory
closes in San Diego and reopens in Tijuana, south of Rio Grande, especially
when Mexican environmental requirements on fumituremakers are far more
demanding than the tough ones in California.
While my own view is that diversity in environmental standards, within an
industry across countries, is perfectly reasonable and is even compatible with
equal overall concern with the environment in these countries, I do feel that this
extra concern that obtains inevitably with international movement of direct
investment in an industry to lower-standard developing countries justifies
resorting to a policy in developed countries (with higher standards in an
industry) which requires that their (say, US) firms, when they go abroad (say, to
Mexico), work with the higher standards (of the US) than with the lower
standards (of Mexico). I.e. in Rome do, not as Romans do, but as Bostonians do.
Since firms are legal persons, American firms can be treated (as indeed
they are in many matters already) as American citizens, subject to US laws
wherever they operate. The conflict of interest that often follows when a country
so exercises its jurisdiction on firms operating abroad — as when the US
sought to enforce the embargo against Cuba on American firms in Canada
is most unlikely to obtain here: it is hard to see Mexico, for instance, objecting to
US firms adopting higher standards of environmental and labor standards in
their factories. In fact, when I recently advanced this proposal at a few
international conferences and in an op.ed. article in The New York Times
(Bhagwati, 1992), the reaction from several Mexicans was favorable, as was that
initially from several Americans, including in Congress. In the end, it did not
take off, partly because the different approach of the supplemental agreements
for NAFTA was more or less set in cement by that time, and largely because US
businesses, which were definitely interested in investing in Mexico contrary to
their coached denials of their intentions once they began to be burnt on the
issue in the public domain, were reportedly unhappy at the thought that they
would be subjected to any restrictions on their ability to exploit whatever local
environmental and labor standards Mexico required of all firms, whether
Mexican or foreign. There is admittedly a problem of "horizontal equity" among
different foreign firms in Mexico: US firms would be abiding by tougher US
standards in Mexico whereas Japanese and European firms would not, thus
putting our firms at a disadvantage. But surely if you believe that your
standards reflect your valuation of environmental damage of a certain variety,
you should stick by them even when others who do not share that valuation do
not. Moreover, we ignore the dynamic of the proposal: if US firms operate at
US standards, that itself is likely to put pressure on other foreign firms to shift to
the US standards in Mexico or face adverse political reactions, including from
Mexican NGOs
The "race-to-the-bottom" issue itself is highly contentious. Both in terms
of economic logic and in empirical terms as to whether lower environmental
and labor standards have actually pulled in capital flows as suggested and
whether, in that event, standards have actually gravitated downwards in reality
in federal setups or across countries, the fears of harmonization downwards
from below are certainly disputed vigorously today. Nonetheless, it must be
said that these fears certainly drive the demands for harmonization upwards as
preconditions for trade liberalization with developing countries.
3. Political Integration versus Simply Free Trade:
In contrast to arm's length free trade, politically integrating nations as in
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the European Union are observed to supplement elimination of trade barriers
with attempts at imposing a minimum set of common standards, especially in
the social sphere, on member states. While the EU (originally the Common
Market or the EC, the European Community) began its discussions of
harmonization, as in the matter of taxation that I discussed above, from the
strictly economic viewpoint, and the demands of the French were certainly
made in this fashion at the time, it seems that the political rationale for these
demands overtook the economic ones as the EC moved ahead. I suspect that
this was definitely the case with demands for labor policy harmonization, which
eventually turned out to assume the political dimension I have defined here,
and which translated eventually into the adoption of the Community Charter of
Fundamental Social Rights, as modified at the Strasbourg European Council in
December 1989 by 11 of the 12 member states then (the exception being the
United Kingdom).
Interestingly, while the NAFTA began originally as a simple free trade
arrangement, closely approximating an arm's length free trade negotiation, the
dynamic was such that it wound up much closer to the EC model of closer
integration, with the supplemental agreements on environment and labor
standards becoming critical components of the treaty. The explanation lies
partly in several of the factors I discussed earlier, such as the fear of decline in
real wages of the unskilled in the US , and the fear also of harmonization
downward from below , otherwise. But the notion that the EC provided the
correct model to think of NAFTA instead became dominant among the NGOs:
the Mexican sociologist Castaneda has particularly emphasized this dynamic of
'unanticipated" transformation of the NAFTA negotiations.33
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 In some of my writings on NAFTA, I took the similar but essentially different position, not
shared by any economist that I know of, that NAFTA was a preferential trade arrangement being
undertaken for, and with, Mexico (and not for others) by the United States, and therefore making
demands on Mexico for a minimum set of democratic and social standards was thoroughly
reasonable as a price to be paid by Mexico. One would not want to make preferential deals for the
benefit of countries that did not adhere to some minimum set of such standards.
References {s<z<fcon l )
Dunn, John, 1984, Locke. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Dunn, John, 1993a, "The Nation State and Human Community: Life
Chances, Obligation and the Boundaries of Society", mimeographed.
King's College, Cambridge.
Dunn, John, 1993b, "Crisis of the Nation State", Paper presented to
the Political Studies Conference, King's College, Cambridge,
September 10 and 11; mimeographed. King's College, Cambridge.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1983, De Cive: The English Version (ed. Howard
Warrender ) Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Hobbes, Thomas, 1991, Leviathan (ed. Richard Tuck), Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hume, David, 1911, A Treatise of Human Nature. 2 volumes, London:
J.M. Dent.
Locke, John, 1960, Two Treatises of Government, (ed. P. Laslett),
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Plant, Raymond, 1993, "Right, Rules and World Order", mimeographed.
University of Southampton.
Smith, Adam, 1976, The Theory of Moral Sentiments, (ed.) D. Raphael
and A. L. Macfie, Oxford: Clarendon Press, (first published 1760).
REFERENCES ^ & 4 » W 3E- 1SJ
Abbott, Kenneth W., 1993, "Defensive Unfairness: The Normative Structure of
Section 301", Preliminary Draft presented to the Conference on
Fairness/Harmonization at Minneapolis, July 29-31; Northwestern University
School of Law, mimeographed.
Baumol, Will, Susan Blackman and Ed Wolff, 199
Berger, Suzanne, 1993, "Domestic Institutions, Trade, and the Pressures for
National Convergence: US, Europe, Japan", M.I.T. Political Science
Department, mimeographed.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1972, "Review of Sovereignty at Bay (New York: Basic
Books, 1991) by Raymond Vernon", Journal of International Economics. Vol.2,
pp.455-459; reprinted in Jagdish Bhagwati, International Factor Mobility (Vol.2
of his Essays in International Economic Theory, edited by Robert Feenstra),
Cambridge: MIT Press, 1983.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1988, Protectionism. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1991a, The World Trading System at Risk. Princeton:
Princeton University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1991b, "Free Traders and Free Immigrationists: Friends or
Foes?", Russell sage Foundation: New York, mimeographed .
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1991c," Fair Trade, Reciprocity and Harmonization: The New
Challenges to the Theory and Policy of Free Trade", Columbia University,
Economics Department Working Paper, to appear as Chapter 13 in Alan
Deardorff and Robert Stern (eds), The GATT and the Multilateral System. 1993.
Ann Arbor: Michigan University Press.
Bhagwati, Jagdish, 1992," ", The
New York Times. Qp.Ed. Page,
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Vivek Dehejia, 1993," Freeing Trade and the Wages of
the Unskilled: Is Marx Striking Again?", Paper presented at the American
Enterprise Institute Workshop on Trade and Wages, September; American
Enterprise Institute, Washington DC, mimeographed.
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Douglas Irwin, 1987, "The Return of the Reciprocitarians:
U.S. Trade Policy Today". The World Economy Vol.10, pp.109-130.
Bhagwati, Jagdish and Hugh Patrick (ed.), 1990, Aggressive Unilateralism, Ann
Arbor: Michigan University Press.
Buchanan, James and Charles Goetz, 1972, "Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility:
An Assessment of the Tiebout Model", Journal of Public Economics. Vol. I.
Chanda, Rupa, 1993, Trade Liberalization and Direct Foreign Investment, Ph.D.
Dissertation, Economics Department, Columbia University.
Frenkel, Jeff, 1993,"
American Economic Review (Papers & Proceedings). May.
Hymer, Stephen, 1976, The International Operations of National Firms: A Study
of Direct Foreign Investment. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Jackson, John , 1969, World Trade and the Law of GATT. New York: The Bobbs-
Merrill Company, Inc.
Johnson, Harry, Paul Wonnacott and Hirofumi Shibata, 1968, Harmonization of
National Economic Policies under Free Trade. Private Planning Association of
Canada, Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Oates, Wallace and Robert Schwab, 1988, "Economic Competition among
Jurisdictions: Efficiency Enhancing or Distortion Inducing?", Journal of Public
Economics. Vol.35.
Ohlin, Bertil, 1965, "Some Aspects of Policies for Freer Trade", in R.E.Baldwin
et.al. (eds), Trade. Growth and the Balance of Payments: Essays in Honour of
Gottfried Haberler, Amsterdam: North Holland Co.
Reddaway, Brian, 1958, " The Implications of a Free Trade Area for British
Taxation", British Tax Review, March, pp.71-79.
Revesz, Richard, "Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-
to-the-Bottom" rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation", New York
University Law Review. December, pp. 1210-1254.
Servan-Schreiber, Jean-Jacques, 1968, The American Challenge.London:
Hamish Hamilton.
Stewart, Richard, 1977a, "Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of Federalism in
Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy", Yale Law
Journal. Vol. 86, pp. 1196-1212.
Stewart, Richard, 1977b, "The Development of Administrative and Quasi-
Constitutional Law in Judicial Review of Environmental Decisionmaking:
- M 7 -
Lessons from the Clean Air Act", Iowa Law Review, Vol. 62, pp.713-747.
Shoup, Carl (ed.), 1967, Fiscal Harmonization in Common Markets, Vol. I:
Theory, New York: Columbia University Press.
Tiebout, Charles, 1956, " A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures", Journal of
Political Economy. Vol.64.
Tolchin, Martin and Susan Tolchin, 19
1993-94 Discussion Paper Series
Department of Economics
Columbia University
420 W. 118 St., Room 1022
New York, N.Y., 10027
Librarian: Angie Ng
The following papers are published in the 1993-94 Columbia University Discussion Paper
series which runs from November 1 to October 31. Domestic orders for discussion papers are
available for purchase at $5.00 (U.S.) each and $140.00 (U.S.) for the series. Foreign orders
cost $8.00 (U.S.) for individual paper and $185.00 for the series. To order discussion papers,
please send your check or money order payable to Department of Economics, Columbia
University to the above address. Please be sure to include the series number for the paper when
you place an order.
671. Investment in U.S. Education and Training
Jacob Mincer ( Nov. 1993)
672. Freer Trade and the Wages of the Unskilled: Is Marx Striking
Again?
Jagdish Bhagwati and Vivek Dehejia
673. Employer Size and Labor Turnover
Todd Idson
674. Less Crime May Be Worse
Brendan O'Flaherty
675. Team Production Effects on Earnings
Todd Idson
676. Language, Employment, and Earnings in the United States:
Spanish-English Differentials from 1970 to 1990
David Bloom and Gilles Grenier
677. The Impact of Performance Incentives on Providing Job Training
to the Poor: The Job Training to the Poor: The Job Training Partnership
Act (JTPA)
Michael Cragg
678. The Demands to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading Nations
Jagdish Bhagwati
679. Mass Layoffs and Unemployment
Andrew Caplin and John Leahy
680. The Economics of Adjustment
Andrew Caplin and John Leahy
681. Miracle on Sixth Avenue: Information Externalities and Search
Andrew Caplin and John Leahy
682. Arbitrage, Gains from Trade and Scoial Diversity: A Unified Perspective on
Resource Allocation
Graciela Chichilnisky
683. Who should abate carbon emissions?
Graciela Chichilnisky, Geoffrey Heal
684. Believing in Multiple Equilibria
Graciela Chichilnisky
685. Limited Arbitrage, Gains from Trade and Arrow's Theorem
Graciela Chichilnisky
686. International Emission Permits: Equity and Efficiency
Graciela Chichilnisky, Geoffrey Heal and David Starrett
687. Do Vehicle Emissions Testing Program Improve Air Quality?
Matthew Kahn
688. Sources of Real Exchange Rate Fluctuations: How Important Are Nominal Shocks?
Richard Clarida and Jordi Gali
689. Modeling Soviet Agriculture for Assessing Command Economy Policies
Padma Desai and Balbir Sihag
690. The Changing Labor Market Position of Canadian Immigrants
David Bloom, Gilles Grenier and Morley Gunderson
691. Herd Behavior, the " Penguin Effect ", and the Suppression of
Informational Diffusion: An Analysis of Informational Externalities
and Payoff Interdependency
Jay Pil Choi
692. Shock Therapy and Russia: Was It Tried? Why Did It Fail? What Did It
Do? What Now?
Padma Desai
693. Changes in the Structure of Family Income Inequality in the United States
and Other Industrial Nations during the 1980s
McKinley L. Blackburn and David E. Bloom
694. Necessarily Welfare-enhancing Customs Unions with Industrialization
Constraints: a Proof of the Cooper-Massell-Johnson-Bhagwati Conjecture
Pravin Krishna and Jagdish Bhagwati
695. The Effect of Household Characteristics on Household-Specific Inflation
Rates: An Application to Trends in Child Poverty and Educational Real
Wage Differentials
Todd Idson and Cynthia Miller
696. Threats to the World Trading System: Income Distribution and the
Selfish Hegemon
Jagdish Bhagwati
697. Intraindustry Trade: Issues and Theory
Jagdish Bhagwati and Donald R. Davis
698. A Characterization of Cointegration
Phoebus Dhrymes
699. The Production of Human Capital and the Lifecycle of Earnings:
Variation on a Theme
Jacob Mincer
700. The Philosophy of Locational Competition
Ronald Findlay
